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What is a Premature Death? 
 
Brooke Alan Trisel 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The one who dies is deprived of goods that this person would have enjoyed if he or she had continued 
living, according to the popular “deprivation account of harm.” The person who dies “prematurely” is 
generally thought to suffer the most harm from death. However, the concept of a premature death is 
unclear, as will be shown. I will evaluate various definitions of a premature death and will argue that 
the existing definitions are too ambiguous and unreliable to serve as the basis for estimating the degree 
of harm from death.   
 
 
According to the “deprivation account of harm,” the most popular account of how we 
can be harmed by death, the person who dies may suffer harm by being deprived of 
goods that this person would likely have enjoyed if he or she had continued living. 
Proponents of this view continue to work on overcoming the following challenges to 
their belief. First, because the dead no longer exist, it is not clear who is the subject of 
the alleged harm.  It is also not clear when death is harmful to the person who dies.1 
 
Deprivation theorists often use examples of individuals who died “prematurely” as 
support for their belief. For example, Thomas Nagel (1979, p. 9) writes: “The death of 
Keats at 24 [25]2 is generally regarded as tragic; that of Tolstoy at 82 is not. Although 
they will both be dead for ever, Keats’ death deprived him of many years of life 
which were allowed to Tolstoy; so in a clear sense Keats’ loss was greater. . . .” To 
give another example, Steven Luper (1993, p. 272) writes: “The idea that a premature 
death is a misfortune for its victim seems rather obvious. I believe that it has been 
responsible for most of the anxiety which people (such as I) have felt about dying. . . ” 
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Although deprivation theorists use the concept of premature death in their arguments, 
they often do not indicate what they mean by a premature death. What is a premature 
death? The term “premature death” suggests that the person died before something, 
but before what? In response, one might reply that if someone dies prematurely that 
this means that the person died before the person should have died. However, it is not 
clear, as will be discussed later, whether this is a non-moral statement or whether it 
simply reflects one’s desire for the person to have lived longer. The notion of a 
premature death is ambiguous, as will be shown, and requires clarification.  
 
Nagel argues that we can be harmed by death despite the age at which we die; even a 
person who lived to the age of 806 could be so harmed. If death can be harmful 
regardless of the age at which we die, then one might question whether there is a need 
to clarify the concept of a premature death. Although some deprivation theorists 
believe that everyone, no matter the age at which they die, can be harmed by death, 
other deprivation theorists dispute Nagel’s account and suggest that death can be 
harmful only to those who die prematurely.3 Therefore, it is important to obtain a 
better understanding of the concept of a premature death.  
 
Deprivation theorists can be seen as making two claims. First, they claim that death 
may be harmful to the one who dies. Second, they claim that the degree of 
harmfulness varies among those who die; one person may suffer little or no harm 
from death whereas another person may suffer great harm. Why should we be 
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concerned with the question of how much harm occurs? Why not just focus on the 
question of whether death is harmful to the one who dies?  
 
If the members of a jury hear a victim of a crime declare that she was harmed, the 
jurors want to know, not just whether harm occurred, but how much the victim was 
harmed. Did the harm result in the victim being deprived of only a day’s worth of lost 
wages or was the harm so severe that the victim was deprived of the ability ever to 
work again? Similarly, when it is claimed that a person was harmed by death, it is 
important to know, not just whether harm occurred, but the severity of the harm.  
 
Deprivation theorists could be correct that those who die may suffer harm, but 
incorrect regarding how much harm is occurring. This harm, if it is occurring, might 
be great or negligible.  To convince us that the harm from death is significant enough 
that it warrants our attention, deprivation theorists must have a reliable and objective 
method for determining the degree of harm. Does such a method exist? What are the 
methods used to measure the amount of harm? Are these methods reliable indicators 
of the degree of harm? The principal aim of this paper is to evaluate the methods 
utilized to judge the amount of harm from death. I will argue that the existing methods 
are ambiguous and unreliable and need more work if they are to do the job of 
measuring the degree of harm.  
 
I. The Relations Between Deprivation, Prematurity, and Harm 
Joel Feinberg (1993, p. 187) argues: “The degree of harmfulness of a person’s 
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premature death thus depends on how premature it is, given the interests that defined 
his own particular good.” Feinberg’s statement shows that the degree of harm is 
thought to be positively correlated with the degree of prematurity. In other words, as 
the level of prematurity or deprivation increases, there is a corresponding increase in 
the level of harm that is suffered by the one who dies. A person who dies at age 80 is 
generally thought to suffer little or no harm from death, whereas a person who dies at 
age 18 is thought to have suffered great harm.  
 
Deprivation theorists believe that death may be harmful to those who die because it 
deprives them of goods that they would have enjoyed if they had not died when they 
did. For example, suppose that a person has a strong desire to write a best-selling 
novel and then is killed at the age of 30 before he had the opportunity to complete the 
novel. His death will prevent him from ever enjoying the satisfaction of achieving his 
goal. Even if he had lived to the age of 120, he might never have achieved the goal of 
writing a best-selling novel. Therefore, deprivation theorists, in estimating how much 
harm occurs, typically only count goods that one would or might have enjoyed if one 
had continued living.4  
 
If a person who has done everything that he wanted to do in life dies at age 45, one 
could argue that the deprivation of years of life did not result in the deprivation of any 
goods. Because the deprivation of time does not always result in harm, deprivation 
theorists are more concerned with determining how many goods were lost to death 
than simply measuring how much time was lost to death. However, measuring lost 
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goods or missed opportunities can be very difficult.  
 
What is a good, how do we know that the person who died likely would have enjoyed 
that good, and how do we place a numeric value on goods to determine the amount 
and value of goods lost to death? These questions illustrate some of the difficulties 
one faces in attempting to measure the amount and value of goods lost to death.  
 
People have attempted to measure the amount of harm from death indirectly and 
directly. The indirect measures focus on measuring the amount of time lost to death, 
whereas the direct measures focus on measuring the amount and value of goods lost to 
death. Because deprivation theorists are primarily concerned with lost goods, they 
tend to use the direct measures of harm, which are more abstract and difficult to 
quantify than the indirect measures. In contrast, laymen and epidemiologists tend to 
use the indirect measures of harm.  
 
II. Indirect Measures of Harm 
To have the opportunity to enjoy the goods associated with living, one must live for a 
certain amount of time. If a person lived for only a minute, there would be no 
enjoyment of goods. There is a correlation between the amount of goods that can be 
enjoyed in one’s life and the length of one’s life, but how strong is this correlation? If 
there were a perfect correlation between the length of one’s life and the amount of 
goods that can be enjoyed in one’s life, such that each additional year of life would 
yield an additional 100 units of goods, then one could indirectly measure goods lost to 
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death in terms of time lost to death. For example, if the person who died was deprived 
of five years of life, we would then know that this person was deprived of 500 units of 
goods.  
 
The indirect measures of harm that will be considered below are based on the 
assumption that there is a fairly strong correlation between the length of one’s life and 
the amount and value of goods that can be enjoyed in one’s life. Is this a correct 
assumption? If well-being in one’s life is not additive,5 or if one may value goods 
enjoyed later in life more than goods enjoyed earlier in one’s life, then the amount of 
time lost to death may not be an accurate indication of the value of the goods lost to 
death. This would pose a problem for the indirect measures of harm. 
 
To judge whether, and to what extent, someone died prematurely, laymen often 
subtract the age at which the person died from the average life expectancy.  For 
example, if a person died at age 30 and the average life expectancy was 75, then the 
difference between these two figures - 45 years of life - is thought to be the amount of 
time lost to death.    
 
Knowing the average life expectancy is useful information for economists. However, 
using the average life expectancy as a method for determining whether an individual 
died prematurely is arbitrary and problematic. A common misconception of the 
average life expectancy is that it is a measure of how long an individual can expect to 
live.6 The average “life expectancy at birth” measure, which is the most frequently 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 11 (2007): 54-82 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                                                                            Brooke Alan Trisel 60
reported life expectancy measure, does not represent how long any one individual can 
expect to live. Rather, it represents the average number of years of life that a 
hypothetical cohort of people can expect to live from the time of birth.7  For example, 
the hypothetical cohort of males born in 2002 in the United States can expect to live 
an average of 74.5 years.8 This cohort is considered “hypothetical” because the 
prediction is based on the assumption that they will experience the same mortality 
rates that prevailed for the actual population in 2002.  
 
Many people assume that all males born in 2002 can expect to live until the age of 74  
and, if one of them does not, then they conclude that he died prematurely. Because, 
however, the life expectancy figure represents the average number of years that the 
hypothetical cohort can expect to live, statisticians who calculate the figure recognize 
that some males will live until or longer than 74 years and millions of males will have 
shorter life spans than 74 years.  
 
Using the average life expectancy as a way of judging whether an individual died 
prematurely is a crude and inexact method of judging prematurity. It is uncertain why 
many people use the average life expectancy as a method for judging whether an 
individual died prematurely. It may be the result of misunderstanding what the 
measure represents, it may be because the number is readily available, or it may 
reflect how long they want to live, or perhaps it is all these reasons.  In adopting the 
average life expectancy as the way of judging prematurity, one may be implicitly 
making a normative statement about how long a person should have lived, as will be 
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discussed in more detail later.  
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines a premature death as a death that 
occurs before the age of 50. (World Health Report 1998, p. 1) The WHO indicates 
that the age of 50 reflects the global average life expectancy in 1948. (World Health 
Report 1998, p. v) This definition exemplifies the arbitrariness of some of the 
definitions of premature death.  
 
To measure the burden of disease in a society, epidemiologists calculate how many 
years of life were lost to premature death. This is calculated by subtracting the various 
ages at which individuals in a population died from the average life expectancy or an 
arbitrarily chosen number such as the age of 65. This measure is called “years of 
potential life lost” (YPLL).9  One problem with this measure, as epidemiologists have 
recognized, is that it fails to take into account that someone might have died of a 
different disease from the one that killed the person. For example, if someone dies of 
heart disease at age 45, it cannot be assumed that this person was deprived of 20 years 
of life because this person might have developed cancer or another disease and died 
before age 65. Because of the preceding problem of “competing risks,” as it is called, 
and other limitations with the YPLL measure, epidemiologists are attempting to 
develop better population-based measures of prematurity.10  
 
To determine, in a precise way, whether someone died prematurely, it would be 
necessary to have a person-specific measure of prematurity, as opposed to a 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 11 (2007): 54-82 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                                                                            Brooke Alan Trisel 62
population-based measure such as the YPLL measure. If Keats had not contracted 
tuberculosis, we assume that he had the potential to live much longer than he did and 
that he had not reached his potential life expectancy. As noted, this notion of a 
potential life expectancy has been used by epidemiologists. It has also been implicitly 
used by some philosophers, as will be discussed later.  
 
The notion of a potential life expectancy is appealing, but it is not as clear as it might 
at first seem. What is a potential life expectancy? A maximum or potential life 
expectancy can be thought of as a limit. If one reaches one’s potential life expectancy, 
then there is nothing further that could be done to prolong one’s life. For example, 
suppose that a person is dying of kidney failure. Through dialysis, other medical 
treatments, and good nutrition, this person’s life may be prolonged by many years. 
However, there will be a point at which nothing further could be done to prolong this 
person’s life. When the person reaches that limit, he will be at his potential life 
expectancy.  
 
The results obtained using the person-specific, potential life expectancy measure may 
differ from the results obtained by subtracting the age at which a person died from the 
average life expectancy.  Suppose, for example, that a healthy person died in a car 
accident at age 80, but he could have lived until the age of 100 if he had not been in 
the car that day. This person’s death would not have been premature based on the 
average life expectancy calculation, but was premature by 20 years based on the 
potential life expectancy measure. The reverse is also true in that deaths that are 
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typically thought of as “premature” may not be premature under the potential life 
expectancy measure, as discussed below.  
 
It is rare for someone born with infantile Tay-Sachs disease11 (an inherited disease of 
the central nervous system) to live beyond the age of five. If a child with Tay-Sachs 
disease dies at age five, then the death of this child would likely not have been 
premature based on the potential life expectancy measure. Thus, the results obtained 
using the potential life expectancy measure may seem counterintuitive.  
 
An advantage of the person-specific, potential life expectancy measure over the 
population-based measures of prematurity is that it would be a more accurate way of 
judging the amount of time that a person lost to death.  However, in determining one’s 
potential life expectancy we are faced with the problem of competing risks, as noted 
earlier. If Keats had not died of tuberculosis, he might have died two years later from 
pneumonia or he could have died in an accident at age 45. There currently is no way 
of knowing a person’s potential life expectancy, which limits the usefulness of this 
measure.  
 
III. Direct Measures of Harm 
Gisela Striker (1988) has defined premature death, not in terms of how much time 
was lost to death, but in terms of whether one’s life was “complete” before one died.  
If one died before one’s life was complete, then one died prematurely, she argues. 
Striker uses the following analogy to suggest that people are concerned, not with how 
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long they will live, but about whether they will be able to complete all of the stages of 
their lives.  
 
The eighteen year old who wants to continue living is like 
someone who has watched the first act of an opera and is 
justifiably annoyed if the performance breaks off at this point. 
He is angry, not because he had thought he was going to 
spend three hours instead of only one, but because he wanted 
to see the entire opera, not just a part of it. (Striker 1988, p. 
325) 
 
Stephen Rosenbaum, who has defended12 Epicurus’ argument that death is nothing to 
us, calls into question Striker’s notion of a premature death. He convincingly argues 
that the idea of completeness is obscure. (Rosenbaum 1990, pp. 32-35)  Our lives, in 
contrast to operas, are not well structured with standard elements and so the task of 
specifying what constitutes a complete life is dubious, he argues.  If our lives did have 
standard elements, then it would be possible to convert Striker’s definition of a 
premature death into a measure for calculating the degree of harm from death. For 
example, if there were 100 standard elements to a life, and a person had completed 
only 60 of these elements before she died, we could then say that the degree of 
incompleteness of her life was 40 percent. But, as Rosenbaum argues, the task of 
identifying standard elements appears to be dubious.  
 
Physicians define a “premature birth” as a birth that occurs before 37 weeks of 
gestation.13 Thus, birth prematurity is defined in terms of time, perhaps because it is 
the simplest method for tracking the progress of a pregnancy. However, a premature 
birth could also be defined in terms of completeness because a fetus must pass 
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through certain developmental stages before it can survive outside the mother’s 
uterus. 
 
As the above example of a premature birth demonstrates, to define prematurity in 
terms of completeness, it is necessary to have a clearly conceived notion of the 
endpoint and of the progression toward the endpoint. Both of these conditions are 
absent regarding a human life. Viewing this issue from a biological perspective, one 
might argue that reproduction is an essential stage in the life of a human being and, 
therefore, define a premature death as a death that occurs before one reproduces. This 
would be an objective measure of prematurity. But what about people who are unable 
to have children or who choose not to have children? According to this definition, all 
of their deaths will be premature, even if they do not die until they are 100 years old.  
 
This biologically based definition of premature death implies that there is nothing 
more to life than experiencing childhood and perpetuating the species and that one’s 
life is “complete” once one ceases reproducing. In response, one might argue that the 
task of parenting does not end at reproduction; a parent or adult is also necessary for 
child rearing. However, questions then arise about how long a parent is needed to 
nurture a child and whether it takes two parents or just one to do this task. In effect, 
the definition of prematurity becomes value-laden. 
 
If a person dies, and he had goals in the years leading up to his death, but achieving 
these goals left him unfulfilled or miserable, then it seems implausible that he was 
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harmed by death. For this reason, Steven Luper defines a premature death as a death 
that prevents its “victims from fulfilling fulfilling desires.” (Luper-Foy 1993, 271-
272) Could Luper’s definition be converted into a measure of harm? As a first step 
toward determining whether this would be feasible, work would need to be done to 
identify under what conditions a desire is fulfilling versus unfulfilling. 
 
Fred Feldman (1991) claims that death harms us eternally - a claim that some have 
disputed.14  In his essay, Feldman outlines an interesting method for calculating the 
degree of harm. He assumes that there are possible worlds and then asks us to 
compare the value of a state of affairs to a person in  a world in which he dies at t to 
the nearest possible world in which he does not die at t. He gives the following 
example to illustrate how his method is used. Feldman asks us to imagine that he is 
taking an airplane trip to Europe, that the plane is sabotaged, and that he dies when 
the plane crashes. His method directs us to consider the nearest possible world in 
which he does not die in the plane crash. If the amount of pleasure minus pain in the 
world in which he dies in a plane crash is 500 units, but is worth 1,100 units in the 
nearest possible world in which he does not die at t, then his death on this trip would 
have a value of negative 600 and would be a terrible misfortune.  
 
Feldman’s method is a direct measure of harm insofar as it attempts to measure 
whether the person would have been better off if he had not died at t. The focus is on 
measuring quality of life as opposed to quantity of life.  However, the method also 
implicitly relies on the notion of a potential life expectancy discussed under the 
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indirect measures of harm. For example, regarding the possible world in which he 
does not die in the airplane crash, he writes: “Suppose I there do live to enjoy many 
happy years of retirement.” (Feldman 1991, 216) 
 
Jeff McMahan (1988) had earlier proposed and ultimately rejected an account similar 
to Feldman’s.  In his paper, McMahan reflected on an example where a young officer, 
if he had not been shot and killed by Ivan, would have been killed a few seconds later 
by a bullet from Boris. Regarding the example, if the officer had been killed a few 
seconds later by a different bullet, then his death from the earlier bullet deprived him 
of only a few seconds of life. In his reply to McMahan, Feldman seems to want us to 
imagine that in the nearest possible world that the officer “is wounded, but recovers 
and goes on to live a long and happy life.” (Feldman 1991, 226) Of course, if we 
imagine this, we will then conclude that the officer’s death from Ivan’s bullet was 
very harmful.   
 
As noted earlier, epidemiologists are seeking to improve the “years of potential life 
lost” measure because it fails to take into account competing risks. It is unclear 
whether the method proposed by Feldman accounts for competing risks. For example, 
if a 35-year-old dies of cancer, but would have died at the age of 36 from a ruptured 
aneurysm in his brain if he had not earlier died of cancer, what would his potential life 
expectancy be with Feldman’s method? If we imagine that this person lives a long and 
happy life in the possible world in which he does not die at t from cancer, we would 
then greatly overstate the amount of harm that this person suffered from his death at 
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age 35.  
 
It is also unclear whether the method proposed by Feldman properly accounts for 
individuals born with genetic diseases who have a short life expectancy. As 
mentioned, it is rare for children with Tay-Sachs disease to live beyond the age of 
five. Suppose that a child with Tay-Sachs disease dies at the age of three in an 
airplane crash. With Feldman’s method, are we to imagine that the child lives a long 
and happy life in the possible world in which he does not die at age three or should 
we, as I believe, imagine that the child lives until the age of five?  
 
If we presume that the child with Tay-Sachs disease would have lived a long life if he 
had not died in the airplane crash, we will misjudge how much this child was harmed 
by his death at age three. In the future, treatments may be available to prolong the 
lives of children born with Tay-Sachs disease. If so, then children born at that time 
may have a potential life expectancy that is much longer than five years.  
 
IV. A Thought Experiment About Premature Death 
What conditions would need to be present for a world to have no premature deaths? If 
we were immortal or, in other words, if there were no deaths, then there would be no 
premature deaths. Immortality is the most obvious scenario in which there would be 
no premature deaths. Are there any scenarios in which there would be deaths in a 
world, but no premature deaths? 
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Suppose that there was a world in which everyone dies on his or her 50th birthday. For 
the sake of brevity, this world will be called “Lifespan 50.” On Lifespan 50, a person 
born in 1980 would live until the year 2030 and someone born in 2000 would live 
until the year 2050.  No one could die sooner or later than the age of 50. For example, 
no one could die at age 40 or live until age 70. Would this scenario in which everyone 
has a fixed lifespan of 50 years be an example of a world in which there are deaths, 
but no premature deaths?  
 
If one were to define a premature death as a death in which one dies before one’s 
potential life expectancy, then this world in which no one dies before their potential 
life expectancy would be a world without premature deaths. However, if one were to 
adopt Striker’s definition of a premature death as a death that occurs before one’s life 
is complete, then Lifespan 50 would not be a world without premature deaths. For 
example, if a person is in a vegetative state from the age of 15 to 45 and then recovers 
some functional capabilities, when this person dies at age 50 his death would be 
premature, Striker would likely argue. Although he lived to his potential life 
expectancy of 50 years, his life was incomplete and so his death was premature.    
 
The question of whether there would be premature deaths in a world in which 
everyone has a lifespan of 50 years was discussed above. Below I consider a different 
question. Would the people on Lifespan 50 consider their upcoming deaths to be 
premature? Some people may be fully satisfied with living 50 years of life. Others, 
however, might wonder what it would be like to live beyond their 50th birthday. They 
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might think how much better life would be if they could live until the age of 60 or 70. 
 
There could be a discrepancy between whether they consider their upcoming deaths 
premature and whether their deaths would actually be premature. According to the 
potential life expectancy definition of a premature death, their deaths would not be 
premature because they live until their potential life expectancy. But if, for example, a 
person became a grandmother at age 49, and she intensely desired to interact with her 
grandchildren, she may consider her upcoming death to be premature. 
 
One way that Lifespan 50 differs from the world in which we live is that everyone in 
this imaginary world knows when they will die, assuming that they remember when 
they were born. If one knew the date at which one would die, one could avoid 
beginning projects late in one’s life so that these projects would not go uncompleted 
because of death. However, as shown by the example above where the grandmother 
wants to interact with her grandchildren, death may prevent us from realizing some of 
our desires even if we knew the exact date on which we will die. 
 
In this thought experiment, suppose that a life-prolonging substance is created that 
would allow people to live until age 60, but that there is only enough of this substance 
for half the population. The other half of the population will live until age 50. Will the 
people who will not receive the substance die prematurely at the age of 50?  
 
Before addressing this question, it will be useful to reflect on the psychological 
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reactions of the people who will not be receiving the substance. As argued, before the 
life-prolonging substance became available, some people on Lifespan 50 would likely 
have been satisfied with living 50 years. If they were not selected to receive the life-
prolonging substance, would they still be satisfied with 50 years of life, or would 
they, as I suspect, think that they will be dying prematurely at the age of 50?  
 
They will live just as long (50 years) as they would have lived before the substance 
became available, but they would likely no longer think of themselves as having lived 
a full life. What would lead them to think that they are dying prematurely? As will be 
explained, I believe that the answer can be traced to rising expectations and to the 
desire for fairness.  First, the availability of the life-prolonging substance would 
change their expectation about how long a person can live. They become aware that it 
is physically possible for a person to live until age 60. Second, previously everyone 
lived the same amount of time. However, because they will not be receiving the life-
prolonging substance, they will not live as long as the people who will be receiving 
the substance, which raises issues about fairness. They had been satisfied with 50 
years of life, but now that they know that half the population will live until the age of 
60 they think that they are entitled to live until that age. 
 
Issues around fairness can introduce bias into judgements about whether, and to what 
extent, someone died prematurely. At the beginning of this section, we reflected on 
the question of whether there would be premature deaths in a world in which 
everyone had a lifespan of 50 years. An example of a person who was in a vegetative 
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state from the age of 15 to 45 was considered and it was concluded that this person 
would die prematurely at age 50 based on Striker’s definition of a premature death. 
What if a person on Lifespan 50 did nothing but play video games from the age of 15 
to 45 and then decided, as the date of his death approached, that he should do more 
with his life? Because he started so late in life, he will not enjoy nearly as many goods 
as other people who began enjoying the goods of life at a younger age. When he dies 
at the age of 50, will his death be premature?  
 
Because this individual had the opportunity to enjoy various goods in life, but chose 
to spend his life playing video games, I suspect that some people would argue that his 
death at age 50 was not premature. In contrast, the person in the vegetative state from 
age 15 to 45 did not choose to live in such a state. The person who was in the 
vegetative state and the former video game player enjoyed similar amounts of goods 
in their lives, but judgements may differ about whether these individuals died 
prematurely. If so, what does this say about these judgements? I believe that it shows 
that considerations of fairness often underlie, and can bias, judgements about the 
degree to which someone was harmed by death.  
 
If, for example, a child with Tay-Sachs disease dies in an airplane crash at age three, 
and it is assumed that this child would have lived a long and happy life if this child 
had not died in the crash, then this assumption may reflect an underlying desire for 
there to be equal amounts of well-being, or at least equal life spans, among all 
individuals. Are there objective grounds for taking fairness into account regarding 
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judgements of prematurity? If it could be demonstrated that we are entitled to live to a 
certain age, this would provide an objective basis for taking fairness into account 
regarding judgements of prematurity. For example, if one were entitled to live until 
age 65, and then is born with Tay-Sachs disease and dies at age five, then a great 
injustice would have occurred. This person would have been deprived of 60 years of 
life that she was entitled to live. The death would be premature because the person 
had an entitlement to live until the age of 65 and this person’s right to live until that 
age was violated when she died at the age of five.  
 
Are we entitled to live to a certain age? If so, what is the source of that entitlement? 
Nature is impersonal and has given us no assurances regarding how long we will live. 
Unless we are entitled to live to a certain age, which appears doubtful, there is no 
basis for including considerations of fairness in judgements about whether, and to 
what extent, someone was harmed by death.  
 
What does it mean when someone claims that a person died “too soon” or “should 
have lived longer”? The person might be making a non-moral claim about the death. 
For example, if the person was young and appeared to be in good health, they may be 
claiming that the conditions did not seem sufficient to have caused this person to die 
when he did. On the other hand, the word “should” in the claim “he should have lived 
longer” may simply reflect their desire for the person to have lived longer. Without 
probing the thoughts of the person who made the claim, we would not know whether 
the claim is non-moral or normative.  
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As Hume (1992, p. 469) is well known for pointing out, people have a tendency to go 
beyond making statements about the way something “is” to making statements about 
the way something “ought” to be. This leap from “is” to “ought” frequently seems to 
occur when people learn that someone died at a young age. Instead of simply 
concluding that the person died at a young age or had a shorter than average lifespan, 
they claim that the person died “too soon,” implying that this person ought to have 
lived longer than he or she did live. 
 
If someone declares that a person’s height is below average, then this individual is 
making a descriptive statement. However, if this person goes on to declare that this 
individual is “too short,” then this person may be making a normative statement about 
how tall this individual ought to be. In the same way, when someone declares that a 
person’s death was “too soon,” “premature,” “untimely,” or “before his time,” this 
person may be making a normative statement about how long this person should have 
lived.  
 
As argued, the judgements that people make about whether, and how much, someone 
was harmed by death can be biased by the desire for fairness. These judgements can 
also be influenced by our feelings toward the person who died. For example, Adolph 
Hitler’s lifespan was shorter than average, but no one would claim that he died 
prematurely.  
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V. The Ambiguity of Measures of Harm 
Above we considered what effect the availability of the life-prolonging substance 
would have on whether the people on Lifespan 50 consider their upcoming deaths to 
be premature. Due to issues of fairness, those who did not receive the life-prolonging 
substance would likely think that their deaths will be premature, but is there an 
objective basis for their conclusions? In other words, when they die at age 50, will 
they have in fact died prematurely? 
 
Let us first reflect on this question using Striker’s definition of a premature death. As 
argued, it is unclear what are the elements of a “complete” life. For the sake of 
argument, suppose that there are 100 standard elements to a life and that some of the 
people who will not be receiving the life-prolonging substance had completed all of 
the elements. They observed all of the opera, to use Striker’s analogy. In not receiving 
the additional ten years of life, the only thing they missed was the unexpected encore. 
In that case, their deaths at age 50 were not premature. But is this ten additional years 
of life simply supplemental, like an unexpected encore, or did the experiences that 
may occur during those ten years somehow become additional elements of what 
makes a life complete? 
 
Because of the ambiguity of the notion of “completeness,” it is not clear whether the 
individuals who will die at age 50 will have died prematurely. What if we use the 
potential life expectancy definition of a premature death? Can we then tell whether 
the deaths of those individuals who did not receive the life-prolonging substance will 
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be premature?  
 
In the introduction to this thought experiment, it was stipulated that the potential life 
expectancy of everyone in this imaginary world was 50 years. Based on this 
stipulation, it was concluded that there would be no premature deaths on Lifespan 50 
based on the potential life expectancy definition of a premature death. However, with 
the creation of the life-prolonging substance, things have become more complicated. 
What is the potential life expectancy of those individuals who will not be receiving 
the life-prolonging substance? Is it 50 years or is it 60 years? Before addressing this 
question, it is necessary to obtain a better understanding of the concept of a potential 
life expectancy.  
 
Through genetic engineering and anti-aging drugs, future generations may have the 
potential to live longer than we do.  Even if everyone born in the year 2100 would 
have the potential to live until age 177, it would not be true that anyone currently 
alive has a potential life expectancy of 177 years. Thus, for the notion of a potential 
life expectancy to make sense, it must take into account the context or, in other words, 
the conditions that were in effect at the time the person was alive. To give another 
example, if there were an undiscovered substance deep in the Atlantic Ocean that 
would prolong human life by 500 years, it would not be true that anyone currently 
alive has a potential life expectancy of over 500 years. For this to be true, we would 
have to know about this substance, have the technology to extract it from the ocean, 
and find a way of making it useable. 
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With this clarification, let us return to the question: What is the potential life 
expectancy of those individuals on Lifespan 50 who did not receive the life-
prolonging substance? If these individuals were given the substance, they would live 
until age 60. However, they are not given the substance. The question becomes 
whether we should take into account that these individuals did not have access to the 
substance in judging their potential life expectancy. If we omit this fact from our 
analysis, it would be concluded that they had a potential life expectancy of 60 years 
and were deprived of 10 years of life when they died at age 50. 
 
Whether they had access to the substance should be considered in determining their 
potential life expectancy. If they did not have access to the life-prolonging substance, 
then their potential life expectancy was 50 years and so they did not die prematurely. 
Similarly, suppose that there are two 50-year-old men with advanced colon cancer on 
Earth and that there is a proven drug on the market for prolonging the lives of 
individuals with this type of cancer. If one person has the ability to pay for this 
expensive medicine and the other does not, it would be reasonable to conclude that 
the person who does not have access to the drug has a shorter potential life 
expectancy than the other person.  
 
A distinction should be made between retrospective and prospective judgements about 
prematurity. One can ask “Was the person’s death premature?” If the person is still 
alive, one might also ask “When he dies, will his death have been premature?” In the 
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thought experiment, both types of questions were asked. 
 
In our daily lives, retrospective judgements about prematurity are probably much 
more common than are prospective judgements. This is fortunate because prospective 
judgements are much more difficult to make than retrospective judgements. Based on 
the potential life expectancy definition of a premature death, it was concluded that 
there were no premature deaths on Lifespan 50, even after the life-prolonging 
substance became available. This, however, ignores other factors that may have 
affected the potential life expectancy of the individuals in this imaginary world. For 
example, if a massive asteroid was on a course to collide with their planet shortly after 
the life-prolonging substance had been created, then, assuming that all life would be 
wiped out, the potential life expectancy of those who received the life-prolonging 
substance would not have been 60 years.  
 
With retrospective judgements about whether someone died prematurely, there are 
still many factors that need to be considered in determining how long the person who 
died could have lived, but because the death has already occurred and we are still 
alive to discuss it, this rules out scenarios, such as asteroid impact, that could have 
occurred, but did not occur.  
  
 
VI. Conclusion 
Direct and indirect measures of harm have been evaluated. The definition of a 
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premature death that is based on the concept of a complete life is too ambiguous to 
serve as the basis for estimating the degree of harm that may be suffered by people 
when they die. The notion of a potential life expectancy was also found to be 
ambiguous. For this notion to be more useful in estimating the amount of time a 
person lost to death, as argued, one would need to take into account the conditions, 
including competing risks, that would have influenced or determined how long she 
would have lived if she had not died when she did. We may misjudge the amount of 
time that this person lost to death if the conditions under which the person lived are 
disregarded and it is assumed that the person would have lived until age 65 or another 
arbitrarily chosen age. 
 
Deprivation theorists might concede that there are problems with the existing 
measures of harm, but then argue that it is unimportant to know how much harm is 
suffered.  However, as I argue at the outset, it is not enough to know that harm occurs. 
It is also important to know the degree of harm.  
 
Luper (2006, p. 11) notes: “[P]roponents of the harm theses still have work to do, for 
their view is not secure unless it is clear that we can be the subject who incurs harms 
associated with absent goods, and unless there is a clear time when the harms are 
received.”  If these challenges can be overcome, the next challenge will be to 
determine how much harm is occurring. As argued here, the concept of a premature 
death is ambiguous and can be value laden and therefore requires refinement if it is to 
serve as the basis for estimating the degree of harm. 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 11 (2007): 54-82 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                                                                            Brooke Alan Trisel 80
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Arias, Elizabeth (2004): “United States Life Tables, 2002,” National Vital Statistics 
Reports 53(6), Hyattsville, Maryland: National Center for Health Statistics, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
November 10, 2004. 
 
Bradley, Ben (2004): “When is Death Bad for the One Who Dies?” Nous 38, 1-28.  
 
Feinberg, Joel (1993): “Harm to Others,” in The Metaphysics of Death. (ed.) John 
Martin Fischer. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 171-190. 
 
Feldman, Fred (1991): “Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death,” The Philosophical 
Review 100 (2), 205-227.  
 
Fischer, John Martin (ed.) (1993): The Metaphysics of Death. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.  
 
Gravel, R.A., et al., (1995): “The GM2 Gangliosidoses,” in The Metabolic and 
Molecular Bases of Inherited Disease. (eds.) C.R. Scriver et al., New York: McGraw 
Hill, 2839-2879. 
 
Hume, David (1992): Treatise of Human Nature. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. 
 
Lee,Wen-Chung (September, 1997): “Quantifying the Future Impact of Disease on 
Society: Life Table-Based Measures of Potential Life Lost,” American Journal of 
Public Health 87, 1456-1460.  
 
Luper-Foy, Steven (1993): “Annihilation,” in The Metaphysics of Death. (ed.) John 
Martin Fischer. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 269-290. Originally published in 
The Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148) (July 1987), 233-52.  
 
Luper, Steven (Spring 2006 Edition): “Death,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. ed. Edward N. Zalta, p. 16, URL:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/death/ 
 
McMahan, Jeff (1988): “Death and the Value of Life,” Ethics, 99(1), 32-61.  
 
Nagel, Thomas (1979): Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Originally published in Nous 4(1) (February 1970).  
 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 11 (2007): 54-82 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                                                                            Brooke Alan Trisel 81
Rosenbaum, Stephen E. (1986): “How to Be Dead and Not Care: A Defense of 
Epicurus,” American Philosophical Quarterly 23(2), 217-225. 
 
Rosenbaum, Stephen E. (1990): “Epicurus on Pleasure and the Complete Life,” The 
Monist 73, 21-41.  
 
Strauss, David (2003): “Longer Life?” Personal Injury Law Journal 13, 2-5. 
 
Striker, Gisela (1988): “Commentary on Mitsis,” Proceedings of the Boston Area 
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 4, 323-328.  
 
Velleman, J. David (1991): “Well-Being and Time,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 
72(1), 48-77. 
 
World Health Organization (1998): The World Health Report 1998: Life in the 21st 
Century A Vision for All, Geneva: World Health Organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
NOTES 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 11 (2007): 54-82 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                                                                            Brooke Alan Trisel 82
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
1 A collection of essays discussing these questions can be found in Fischer (1993). For a recent attempt 
to state when death is a misfortune, see Bradley (2004).  
2 John Keats died at the age of 25 from tuberculosis.  
3 See, for example, McMahan (1988).  
4 For further discussion, see Luper (2006).  
5 Velleman (1991) argues this point. 
6 For further discussion of this misconception, see Strauss (2003). 
7 For further discussion, see Arias (2004). 
8 Arias (2004, 3). In 2002, average life expectancy at birth in the United States was 79.9 for females 
and 77.3 overall.    
9 For further discussion, see Lee (1997). 
10 See, for example, Lee (1997, 1456).  
11 For more information on this disease, see Gravel (1995). 
12 See Rosenbaum (1986). 
13 See, for example, The World Health Report (1998, 68). 
14 For discussion of why Feldman’s claim that death harms us eternally has been disputed, see Luper 
(2006, 12). 
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